

## Conceiving Trust for Philosophy of Religion

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With you today I want to reflect on trust.<sup>1</sup> While the cognitive side of human living is important, as is the volitional side, I focus on the fiducial area of human living, because trust is central to human living. In effect, this lecture is a study of varieties of fiducial experience. Its target is religion, and thus it is an exercise in and for the philosophy of religion. Mostly it will engage theistic religion, and of that mostly Christian theism.

The challenge in conceiving trust for philosophy of religion is captured in three vignettes. A recent newspaper headline reads "In Government We Trust (As Far as We Can Throw It)"; this links trust to what has come to be known as social capital.<sup>2</sup> The newspaper story has the observation that in some cases there

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1. These reflections are part of a larger project dealing with trust and religion. Besides this lecture's four-fold model of trust (instead of a more common two-fold model, the personal and the impersonal), it pays attention to trust relationships among those who are not equals (versus the contract model of trust/suspicion that presumes equality), and it makes use of thought originally developed for ethics, epistemology, and socio-political theory; religious trust therefore does not stand alone. This project follows up on my *A Philosophy of Human Hope*, Studies in Philosophy and Religion, vol. 9 (Dordrecht; Boston; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).

2. Sam Roberts, "In Government We Trust (As Far as We Can Throw It)," *The New York Times*, 4 January 2004, Week in Review, 4. Works of Francis Fukuyama, Mark Warren, and Eric Uslaner are among recent work dealing with government, society, and trust.

is greater trust of one's government representative than of one's government; in other cases there is greater trust in the system of government and less in specific government officials. A newspaper advice column provides our second vignette: a Betrayed Wife asks "Should I keep him?" The Advisor says: "If you love him and plan to stay with him, then sooner or later you're going to have to trust him. He must do his part by behaving impeccably. And how do you trust him? At first, you force yourself. After that, it comes on its own."<sup>3</sup> And our coins give us the third, in the motto: In God We Trust.

Is there any similarity between trust of government, trust of one's spouse, and trust appropriate for God? The stakes are high, because as Thomas Aquinas observes, it is a greater sin to trust God inappropriately than inappropriately to trust oneself.<sup>4</sup> What counts as appropriate trust of God? Or appropriate trust of oneself? Or of another? Are there similarities among these? And these days we can add the current issues involving Catholic bishops, clergy, and sex abuse. The website of the United States Catholic Bishops has a document headed "Restoring Trust."

There has been a recent sheaf of work devoted to trust. Russell Hardin, Karen Jones, Robert Solomon, and Annette Baier come to mind. While they wrestle with the practice and theory of trusting, they set aside discussion of trust in God or point out how incommensurably different it is. According to modern nontheological philosophy, Annette Baier reports that "absolute and unreciprocated trust in God" is considered to be a degenerate form of trust.<sup>5</sup> Philosopher Marcel Sarot points out differences: since God is neither specifiable nor free to defect, and all other forms of trust involve either specifiability or freedom to defect or both, "trusting God differs from all other forms of trust."<sup>6</sup> Robert Solomon and Fernando Flores

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3. Amy Dickinson, "Ask Amy: Should She Act on Her Suspicions?" *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5 January 2004, E2.

4. *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 21, a. 1, ad 1.

5. Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," *Ethics* 96, no. 2 (January 1986): 252 This and other essays dealing with trust are in her *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1994).

observe: "Trust in God requires an unconditional trust unlike any other, trust that may remain firm and consistent through any number of seeming betrayals. But in this sense, it is exceptional and not the paradigm"; "with human beings and institutions, our trust must always be more circumspect and discriminating, even in our most "unconditional" commitments."<sup>7</sup> Thus, there is a great divide between such scholars' understanding of trust and their including trust of God in the scope of understanding.

If scholars punt, saints leap. Kierkegaard's Abraham accepts leaving his Isaac in the hands of God. Job responds to his challenger with: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him"<sup>8</sup> Jesus on the cross says "Into your hands I entrust my spirit." Mother Teresa continues in prayer when all is dark.<sup>9</sup> The Psalms speak freely about trusting God, even in adversity.<sup>10</sup>

In what sense is trust in God exceptional and not the paradigm? "Paradigm" means "typical"; it also means "exemplary, ideal." Is trusting oriented to God so unusual that it should not be included in reflection on features of--and on the virtues and vices of--trusting? Or might we entertain the possibility that some religious trusting sets a standard that humanity would do well to emulate? Chinese Confucian philosophy includes study of paradigmatic exemplary individuals; might study of trust include exemplary trusters?<sup>11</sup>

6. Marcel Sarot, "Why Trusting God Differs from All Other Forms of Trust," *Sophia: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics* 35, no. 1 (March-April 1996): 101–15.

7. Robert C. Solomon and Fernando Flores, *Building Trust: In Business, Politics, Relationships, and Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 76.

8. Job 13:15, KJV.

9. Richard N. Ostling, "Spiritually, Even Mother Teresa Suffered," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2003, B9.

10. For example, Psalm 56:4-5.

11. A. S. Cua, "Confucian Philosophy, Chinese," in *Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2000), 162–63.

I want to help span this divide, so my aim in this lecture is to show how there can be reflection on trust, which, first, can help make such religious trusting intelligible, and, second, lay the groundwork for evaluation. In my larger project concerning trust and religion, there is exploration of analogy, and also review of ethical, socio-political, and epistemological considerations which bear on trusting well or badly, as virtue or as vice.

Some who write about trust confuse trusting with trustworthiness, and wind up calling for more trust when they should be calling for more trustworthiness. But today I am talking about trust, and not directly about trustworthiness.<sup>12</sup>

**FOUR DIMENSIONS OF TRUST.** I propose to consider what I call "dimensions" of trust. To employ the metaphor of dimension is not to imply that differences in trust should be represented quantitatively. "Dimension" suggests that differing trustings are not species of some higher genus, with individual narratives as instantiations of a class or type. Some lines of trusting seem orthogonal to others, and a change in one dimension does not imply a change in another. The term "dimensions" suggests a multi-dimensional matrix--or a CAT scan: varying approaches are like scans at different angles of a body.

I take "trusting" as analyzable along four dimensions. I take these four both because what others write seems to fall out along the lines of these four, and because these four seem to have similarities to what is said in some religious contexts. The four dimensions of trusting are: reliance-trusting; I-thou trusting, security-trusting, and openness-trusting. Alternately they could be termed reliance, relation, security, and openness.

**RELIANCE TRUST.** Initially I set aside reliance on things and focus on relying on persons. I also initially set aside two prominent relationships of trust, the involuntary reliance of the infant, and the

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12. On trustworthiness directly, see Nancy Nyquist Potter, *How Can I be Trusted? A Virtue Theory of Trustworthiness* (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

highly specific and usually sanctioned relationships of promising between adults known as contract. I take as my basic type reliance-trusting a dealing between adults that is neither contractual nor involuntary.<sup>13</sup>

Relying includes expecting: to rely is to count on something happening, and to take appropriate steps to deal with that future outcome.<sup>14</sup> While indeed I can “count on” something bad happening--I trust I will fail again--to trust is, in most usages, to expect what is also desired, what is valued, or what is a good for me or for another. To rely is not merely to have expectations. It is to act on an expectation, or at least be disposed to act on an expectation.<sup>15</sup> But trusting is not merely a matter of expecting what is desired from someone else, and acting in light of that expectation;<sup>16</sup> something else is needed.

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13. Some maintain that all trust is involuntary. While she agrees that trust cannot arise at will, Karen Jones proposes that trusting can be cultivated. "Trust as an Affective Attitude," *Ethics* 107, no. 1 (October 1996): 18, 22.

14. I begin analyzing trust in terms of acting on expectations, rather than begin by taking trusting as a propositional attitude, as a kind of believing, as Russell Hardin does in his *Trust and Trustworthiness*, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, IV (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); or as an acting as if, especially acting as if I believed. Trust understood as acting as if is the analysis favored by Richard Swinburne, *Faith and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Why the expectation-approach is superior to an acting-as-if or acting-on-the-assumption-that approach is a case I argue elsewhere; in sum, the argument maintains that as-if analysis either omits a description (that of firm-commitment reliance) or begs a normative question (that religious trust is best if it is other than unreserved and firm).

15. Expectation, and acting on an expectation, is central to the way trust is defined by Annette Baier, and by Bernard Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983). It is also central to understanding religious faith as trust, as in Jaroslav Pelikan, "Faith," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 5:250–55.

16. I may expect my favorite team to win their next game--they are expected to win--and I desire them to

To act trustingly--or to be trusting or to trust--is to act or refrain from acting so as to effect an increase in the likelihood that the other will help obtain what I want or need, or at least avoid a decrease of likelihood. Essential to the concept, this element of increasing the likelihood that the other will help requires particular attention. How can I act so as to have another's helping me be an effect of my acting?<sup>17</sup> I can affect this likelihood by *entrusting*. I afford an opportunity to help. Thus, to trust a person is to desire and expect and act or refrain from acting so as to enable another to help me and thus so as to increase a kind of likelihood that the other will help me. Since typically I act so as to enable another to help me by letting that person take care of something, to trust is to allow some matter to be in another's care with the expectation that a good outcome will ensue.<sup>18</sup>

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win, and I place a bet in light of my expectation. But this is not to trust my team. It is to hope that they will win, wherein hope is a conjoining of desire and estimated possibility.

17. I can of course connive, maneuver and manipulate, threaten or bribe. But if manipulative or fear-engendering reasons for trusting or accepting trust were to be disclosed to another, this would reduce the prospect of my being helped; Annette Baier makes this point. There are, however, borderline cases where this does not happen. In a relationship characterized by extremes of domination and submission, I could perhaps tell the submissive person why I expect him to help, and he would nonetheless help. I tell him he is my tool, and he agrees merely to be used.

18. It is, however, important to distinguish between allowing a matter to be in another's care and allowing a matter to be within the causal range of someone. Planning for battle, a general might trust that his opponent will not attack from the flank, because this opponent is well known to prefer frontal assaults. The general therefore concentrates on reinforcing the center and leaves his flank unprotected against a flank attack. He leaves his flank within the causal range of his opponent, but to do this is not to 'leave his flank in his enemy's care'. Such adversarial 'trusting' is expecting, risking, gambling; it is not an expecting or allowing of help that characterizes most contexts where trust is at issue. I owe this example and important clarification of a distinction between let-take-care and allow-to-be-within-the-causal-range-of to Michael

Good will. A key feature of reliance trusting towards a person is that of appealing to the good will of another.<sup>19</sup> There is a difference between relying on natural processes and relying on persons. I can rely on salt to season and not to poison, but this is different from relying on a cook to season and not to poison. With nature I am counting on processes to continue as they have been. With persons I am sometimes counting on someone's good will or at least lack of ill will towards me.<sup>20</sup> Good will towards me in particular (in contrast with good will towards people generally) is a feature of personal reliance trust.<sup>21</sup>

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Meyer, in a 1992 conversation. Karen Jones veils the causality but expresses the risk for what is valued in her formula "get dangerously near the things they care about," "Trust as an Affective Attitude," 4.

19. Russell Hardin puts the truster's knowledge of the trusted's goodwill thus: "I trust you because your interests encapsulate mine to some extent--in particular, because you want our relationship to continue." *Trust and Trustworthiness*, xix.

20. Annette Baier contrasts trusting others with merely relying on them. Trusting involves another's good will or at least minimal ill will, whereas merely relying counts on only "their dependable habits or dependably exhibited fear, anger, or other motives compatible with ill toward one, or on motives not directed on one at all. . . . We all depend on one another's psychology in countless ways, but this is not yet to trust them." Trusting can be betrayed; other reliances are disappointed. "Trust and Antitrust," 234–35. The contrast between good will toward me and other factors explanatory of trust is important not only for charting the bases of trust but also for evaluating trust.

21. I use the term "personal reliance trust" to refer to letting another take care of something because of that person's *good will towards me*. In contrast, I use "impersonal reliance trust" when speaking of letting another take care of something because of some factor other than the person's good will towards me; such factors may be the other's social role, psychological disposition, profession, or behavioral pattern, or even another's *general* good will towards others. Personal reliance trust is often motivated by a promise, and promises are usually instances of good will towards the particular person to whom the promise is made. Character cuts across the contrast between the impersonal and the personal, inasmuch as character is a

Range of the cared for. Another key feature of personal reliance trust is the range of what is subject to being cared for. There are limits to the matters concerning which I trust you. I entrust you with some limited range of what I value.

Range of the outcome. Having a range of outcome is another feature of trust. When I entrust something to you, I have in mind a range of outcomes, and I at least implicitly exclude other outcomes. I brought in my car and expected you to adjust my brakes; I did not expect you to replace all my tires, not without consulting me.

Discretion. Both the range of what is to be cared for and the range of outcome depend on discretion extended or discretion withheld. Discretion extended finds vivid expression in what Stonewall Jackson said of Robert E. Lee. "So great is my confidence in General Lee that I am willing to follow him blindfolded."<sup>22</sup>

Vulnerability. But there is one other feature that seems essential to analysis of trust, and that is vulnerability. Someone will be hurt, deprived, wounded if the expectation is not fulfilled, if what is entrusted is neglected or damaged.<sup>23</sup> When vulnerability is included, we the definition: To trust is to allow someone to have some matter to be in that other's care, with expectation and desire for a good outcome, but with vulnerability or risk of a bad outcome. (To suspect, by contrast, is to have a matter within the causal range of another, and to expect and fear a bad outcome, for lack of good will, lack of competence, or perhaps just bad luck.<sup>24</sup>)

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pattern of attitudes and ways of acting, including general good will, that can be due to what I call impersonal factors, or it can be the result of choices made in dealings with particular people.

22. The parting of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, as memorialized on the statue near the Art Museum in Baltimore.

23. Annette Baier thinks that vulnerability is an essential feature of non-contractual trust. "Trust, I have claimed, is reliance on others' competence and willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care." "Trust and Antitrust," 259.

24. Reliance trust doesn't quite have a square of opposition, therefore, with reliance-trust and suspicion as

Subjective and objective vulnerability are different.<sup>25</sup> Objective vulnerability means that a person *can* be harmed. When I am subjectively vulnerable, *I judge that I can* be harmed and I (usually) fear being thus harmed; perhaps, objectively, I cannot be hurt, yet I think I can, and am afraid I will be. Objective and subjective vulnerability trigger the philosophical and theological problem of evil and of moral evil.

There is a difference between finding myself unavoidably vulnerable and choosing to be vulnerable, by putting a matter into another's care and thus subject to another's neglect, incompetence, or ill will. (A person could also choose to put or leave a matter at risk, as a means to something else, gambit-like.) Both found and chosen vulnerability can be objective or subjective or both.<sup>26</sup>

Unreserved. It is of course possible to feel fear and not act on it: I acknowledge but resist the fear, I act with firmness. To act with greater firmness when I have greater impulse to be afraid is to be less reserved in my trusting. We can at least imagine a trust that is unreserved. Reliance-trust is unreserved when I act on an expectation and when what I desire and expect is the highest good or when I feel

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contraries, granting the proposal by Marina Sbisà, "Some Remarks on Belief, Confidence, and Cooperation," in *On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches/De la Croyance: Approches Épistémologiques et Sémiotiques*, ed. Herman Parret, Foundations of Communication (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 311.

25. In making this distinction I follow Nicholas Rescher in pointing out that "at bottom risk is an ontological not an epistemological category: it has to do with action affecting the chance of mishap itself, not with the *recognition* or acknowledgement of this chance." I would add: nor, *at bottom*, with the *belief* that there is chance of mishap. A person can thus be at risk but not be consciously taking a risk, or vice versa. *Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 7.

26. Rescher (pp. 5-6) also observes the differences between intentionally choosing or taking a risk, factually being at risk ("running a risk"), and facing a risk in recognizing one is at risk. One can run or incur a risk without taking a risk, as when a person insouciantly buys a ticket for what will be the Titanic's last voyage.

supremely vulnerable, or both. When reliance trust is reserved, I may hedge my bets, act tentatively, anticipate harm and act so as to minimize its impact, even if doing so reduces the good I may attain or reduces the chances of attaining that good.

It is important to distinguish among several senses of “let take care.” I may entrust or commission another with the care of some matter: I take initiative and bring it about that the matter is within the causal range of another. But sometimes I simply *find* that a matter is within another’s causal range, and I do not withdraw it. I find, for example, that my drinking water is supplied by others and therefore I do not boil it myself. And sometimes a person finds matters in another’s care and does not attempt to withdraw it: a young child cannot remove its welfare from the care of others and become self-sufficient. In addition, one can let take care even when one does not believe the care-taker reliable, or when the care-taker is believed to be unreliable.<sup>27</sup>

Some of the discussion about trust turns on whether to trust is to *entrust*. Presumably to entrust means to place or put, by some action of mine, some good within the causal range of another, and with the understanding that the other will take care of and not harm what is valued and entrusted. In some cases, the one who entrusts does not trust.<sup>28</sup> To entrust is to convey what I value from my control to the control of another, handing over my good by my choice. But there are situations where there is no choice about

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27. D. O. Thomas understands trust to be relying and believing the other is trustworthy; this yields confidence. But “circumstances can arise in which I have to rely upon a person without believing him to be reliable”; I don’t expect him to do what I want him to do. This is a case of not withdrawing (or not attempting to withdraw) a good from another’s care, even though I am suspicious and fear harm or at least fear the non-effecting of good. “The Duty to Trust,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* n.s. 79 (1978): 89–101, at 91. In addition, Kierkegaard, somewhere in *Works of Love*, speaks of the importance of trusting even when I know I will be betrayed.

28. Karen Jones argues that one can entrust when one does not trust. “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” 18. Paul Helm maintains that trusting includes entrusting. *Faith with Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125.

handing over.<sup>29</sup> We might term this latter condition "discovered dependence" and the trusting associated with it "accepted dependence." This condition will be relevant for conceiving trust for philosophy of religion.

Trust and Cognition. Much can be said about reliance-trust and cognition.<sup>30</sup> Having good bases for trusting contributes to its worth, and knowledge is among those good bases, providing prima facie reasonableness for trusting.

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29. Are there situations where I am subject to the goodwill of another towards precisely me, without my deciding to "push" some good into that person's range of causal influence? In Luke's gospel we read of a traveler who was going down to Jericho, fell among brigands and was beaten. Upon him came, finally, a Samaritan. That Samaritan had good will towards him in particular, since by religious, cultural, and ethnic history there was antipathy between Jews and Samaritans. But wounded traveler did not choose to entrust his well-being to the Samaritan; he was simply found lying on the road. Similarly, it seems plausible to consider that an infant child simply finds herself dependent on her parents. Even adoption entails such found dependence, since the adopted infant does not choose to have her well-being in the care of these adopting parents. Of course one could argue that these parents have an obligation to their adopted child. But our focus is the trusting or suspicious attitude of the child, chosen or spontaneously arising. Of course the wounded traveler could wave off ministrations, and thereby withdraw from the Samaritan's goodwill and the care proffered. And we can comparably envision a child stiffening in refusal of the ministrations of parents, especially new and strange parents.

30. Suggestive concerning relationships between cognition and trust are: Keith Lehrer, *Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy* (Oxford University Press, 1997); Richard Foley, *Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2001); James F. Ross, "Rational Reliance," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 62, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 769–98; and C. A. J. Coady, *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1992).

Such treatment of how justified beliefs support trusting as reasonable, as well as relationships between evidentialism and trusting, lies beyond the scope of this lecture this afternoon. And there is the further topic of how trusting supports knowing, especially when we take trust the word of another. This even bigger topic I set aside for now.

Basis of trusting. To complete this analysis of reliance trust, I note the question of the basis, of trusting's reasons, causes, motives. The bases for my trusting a person may be several things I know about the person. What I count on may be a person's competence, including knowledge and skill, or character and general good will, or interests, or a pledge or promise given to me. These would be features (broadly conceived) of the person that count as a reason for me to entrust a matter to the person--the person's trustworthiness. There may also be less personal factors, such as biochemical features of myself or of that other person or of other persons, or the kind of social role I have, as when I delegate a matter to a subordinate.<sup>31</sup> In trusting a thing (here I return to the thing-trusting initially set aside) similar factors, except for character and good will, give a basis for reliance. With both persons and things, such personal and impersonal factors constitute the fifth element, the "because," involved in personal or impersonal reliance trusting. The fact that there is a "because" does not ipso facto make the trusting reasonable; not all explanation is justification.<sup>32</sup>

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31. Or such as the person's likeness to someone whom I already do trust ("He reminds me of my uncle"), as Laurence Thomas has suggested. See his "Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality" in *Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology*, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 254n8.

32. The "encapsulated interest" understanding of trust is an account of how trust is rational (the truster takes the trusted to have an interest in being reliable) and thereby justified. This account, of Russell Hardin in "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust" and in his *Trust and Trustworthiness*, and the accounts of Bernard Williams and others which Hardin surveys, address the rationality of trust and thus the epistemic or moral worth of trust, an evaluating that lies beyond my intended descriptive scope.

The five elements of reliance trusting are, therefore, the subject doing the trusting, the one trusted, the good entrusted or otherwise subject to being affected by the one trusted, the outcome desired and expected, and the basis for the trusting. Put schematically, X trusts Y with Z, and has in view the outcome W, because of R.

I-THOU TRUST. A second dimension of trust is what I shall call I-Thou trust. It might also be termed intersubjective trust, relational trust, intimacy trust. Martin Buber's thought and that of Gabriel Marcel are my principal inspirations for this dimension of trust.

An approximate conception of I-Thou trust can be developed by extrapolation from several features of reliance-trusting. Reliance-trusting includes five elements. I-Thou trusting includes only two. In reliance trusting, there are these five: again, schematically: X trusts Y with Z, for W, because of R.

I-Thou trust is approximated insofar as expectations become unspecific, insofar as the good entrusted is the very self of the person who does the entrusting, and insofar as the reason for the trusting is the very person of the other trusted. Instead of X trusting Y with Z for W because of R, we have X trusts Y with X, because of Y: I trust you with myself because of you. I-thou trust is dyadic.

The movement from specific outcomes expected to a lack of specific expectations underscores the way in which reliance-trusting is instrumental and I-thou trusting is not. I rely on another to do for me. I expect the other to act to further my interests, to serve my ends. Of course I may also or alternately expect that the one I trust will serve not me but others, will meet not my needs but the needs of those I care about. The instrumental context is clear when I look for a substitute: if he cannot take care of my car, I will find someone who can. In reliance-trusting the other whom I trust is replaceable, at least in principle; in my actual circumstances, of course, there may be no substitute at hand.

Intimate trust between friends is one kind of I-thou dyadic trust. I judge it good that this friend be who she, who he, is; I am glad that this person lives, but not just for my sake. To trust a person in such a disinterested way is to bring to that person more of myself, where "self" says more than features about me or interests I have. Indeed, my friend may not have skills, or even certain character-traits, and in dealing with him or her I do not expect help for certain of my interests; I do not rely on my friend in some matters.

But I do bring myself--in contrast with my interests--to this person. I open up to him, to her, and take a chance on what may come of this. While to my doctor I entrust my health, to my friend I entrust my self. I do not withhold my self. I bring to him or her what I consider close to my very self--mind, heart, body, history, weaknesses, strengths, fears and hopes. In this trust of friendship I do not have a specific outcome in mind. What may result may go beyond each person's (at least conscious) ends. This form of trust may become troth--apparently an etymological cousin of trust.<sup>33</sup> The plausibility of this kind of trusting is closely linked to the plausibility of a loving that is neither altruistic nor egoistic but appreciative.<sup>34</sup>

Another way of making clear the contrast between reliance-trusting and I-Thou trusting is to contrast congeniality with intimacy.<sup>35</sup> If I find a replacement, or if I could find a replacement, then my relationship with her or him was not one of intimacy. I found my friend congenial, pleasing, because of what I enjoyed; but I miss my friend only if I find no one comparable. If a relationship is one of congeniality, it is the effect on me--what J. F. M. Hunter calls the output or performance--that I am interested in, perhaps as part of the reciprocally enhancing effects on both of us. We stimulate each other in ways psychological, sexual, intellectual, aesthetic, and through conversation, laughter, silences. Yet I lose interest if such effects wane. The relationship "alters when it alteration finds." Intimacy is something else. In an intimate I-Thou relationship, I remain concerned even if the exchanges between us change. Indeed, I pay attention to even her foibles and imperfections, not because I judge them excellent, but because they are hers. I am

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33. Trust, truth, and troth go back to the Old English *tréowe*, trustworthy. The reconstructed Indo-European root is *deru*, firm, solid, steadfast; hence, "tree".

34. These two kinds of trust, and the contrast between relationships of utility and those of appreciation, are explored in my *Philosophy of Human Hope*, chapters 14 and 15, 155-190.

35. Here I employ a contrast between impersonal congeniality and personal intimacy developed by J. F. M. Hunter in *Thinking About Sex and Love* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 85-93. It is like Aristotle's contrast between friendships based on what is useful or agreeable and friendships wherein each values the other for the other's own sake.

interested in her, I care for her, and this kind of interest and care is not the same as my interest in her qualities.

I-thou trusting is not a form of reliance-trusting; one is not reducible to the other, although reliance-trusting usually accompanies I-thou trusting. I am not claiming that I-thou trust is common; it may indeed be rare, episodic, at least in its fullest forms. It is context that permits recognition of I-thou trust, but the concept may lead to recognition of what sometimes happens between people.

SECURITY TRUST. There seems to be a third type of trust, at least on the descriptive or phenomenological level. It finds an image in the trust of a infant sleeping in the arms of its mother. Call it security-trust or perhaps serenity-trust.

Security-trust is a sense of being basically secure, at-home, upheld in my basic self. It is not a confidence that my particular projects will prosper. It is rather a sense that I belong, am accepted, am OK. I entrust-myself-to, I rest-in or rest-on. I lean back, relax. I sense ground beneath my feet. I am buoyed up, as water buoys relaxed swimming. Security is not slackness; I can lean forward, I can venture, I can strive. I can take a stand. Security-trust is compatible with Zen-like acting. I can take particular ordinary--or extraordinary--risks because on a deeper level I feel OK, I feel firm or confirmed, maintained, upheld. Inevitably the descriptive metaphors involve standing, ground, holding and being held.<sup>36</sup> The less

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36. Another way to express security-trust is as what Donald Evans terms reality-assurance, “the assurance that life is worth living because it has already received the meaning and reality which are necessary for human fulfillment,” to use Martin Buber's words. Assurance of reality is presented through what R. D. Laing calls ontological security: “A basically *ontologically* secure person will encounter all the hazards of life . . . from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity . . . a sense of his integral selfhood and personal identity, of the permanency of things, of the reliability of natural processes, of the substantiality of natural processes, of the substantiality of others . . . The individual, then, may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; . . . as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness and worth; as spatially coextensive with the body.” Evans quotes Martin Buber, *I and Thou*,

security-trust obtains, the less I am able to risk even the most ordinary step; radical insecurity and catatonia are linked.

Security in the sense I set forth contrasts with anxiety. Martin Heidegger has painted the human existential mood and condition of anxiety, *Angst*. This anxiety is not the specific fear of a particular threat, but rather the sense of being lost, thrown, alone. The security I here point out is close to if not identical with the mood and condition of security explored in Otto F. Bollnow's *Neue Geborgenheit*. Security in Bollnow's sense is structurally similar to Heideggerian *Angst*, but is its opposite. It is most clearly seen in education: unless a person feels basically at home, accepted, unless he or she has a sense of belonging, education cannot take place. Bollnow, a philosopher and educational theorist, proposes that basic security is needed for any learning.<sup>37</sup>

Security-trust is not universal or abstract in the usual senses of these terms; nor is it particular. It is not the sense of being equally upheld by everything or by many things in my life, nor is it the sense of being upheld by this particular item in extensional contrast with other particular items. Security-trusting's sense of at-home does have a particular *here* to it. I belong *here*: there is a "shape" to my sense of being upheld.<sup>38</sup> The particularity of security-trust may carry the feeling that the admittedly finite sustaining here-

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Smith translation, (New York: Scribners', 1958), 110, in Evans, *Struggle and Fulfillment: The Inner Dynamics of Religion and Morality* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 23-24; R. D. Laing is quoted on 24-25.

37. Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit: Das Problem einer Überwindung Des Existentialismus*, reprint, 1955 (Stuttgart; Köln: W. Kohlhammer, 1979). Donald Vandenberg makes considerable use of Bollnow in "The Pedagogic Atmosphere," *Philosophy of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society* 30 (1974): 101-14, but some of what Vandenberg speaks of is more like what I term openness trust. Compare security trust to Wittgenstein's remark "A language game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say 'can trust something')" *On Certainty* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), #509, p. 66.

and-now is in turn sustained or encompassed by some larger context. Security-trust may carry a sense that the *here* of my being all right is part of a network that includes everywhere: “In the last analysis, nothing can really harm me.” As the Bible has it, “Underneath are the everlasting arms” (Deut 33:27, RSV).

Security-trusting as contrasted with *Angst* is different from those strictly limited particular forms of being secure where I am secure *from* or secure *against*: “I’m safe as long as I don’t go outside”; these are cases of counting-on having a specific this-at-this-time to serve my purposes, to be a means to my ends, and are thus essentially cases of reliance-trusting. Security-trust is compatible with feeling threatened by something specific: I can look a danger in the eye and look to the safety of myself or others--but only if I’m basically confident, not paralyzed by all-pervasive anxiety. Security-trust is compatible with lack of thorough knowledge of what is going on: basically assured, I can hang loose from fears of not knowing everything I’d like to know. I don’t crave systematic closure that risks being Procrustean. I can be patient, and persistent, without fundamental anxiety about myself. Thus there can be secure untroubled reliance trust or anxious struggling reliance trust: I can rely with deep insecurity and I can rely with deep confidence.<sup>39</sup>

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38. Security trust is like what Gabriel Marcel calls “fundamental existential assurance,” “the affirmation of an original link, one could even say an umbilical link, which unites the human being, not to the world in general, which would mean nothing, but to a certain determinate ambience which is as concrete as a cocoon or a nest.” (I use this more detailed translation provided by Joan Nowotny (“Gabriel Marcel’s Philosophy of Hope,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1974, 285) from *Pour une sagesse tragique et son au-delà* (Paris: Plon, 1968), 67, rather than the less literal published translation in *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 38.

39. It should not be naïvely assumed that security trust is a virtue and anxiety is unfortunate. Matters are more complex than that, and the complexities have implications. One complication is the extent of security-trust: the more expansive or “cosmic” security-trust is, the more its justification poses a cosmofiducial question akin to the cosmological argument for the existence of God. Is the universe really a home for me? Or is there something or someone that provides a home, either in the cosmos or beyond it?

OPENNESS TRUST. I propose that, besides reliance-trusting, I-thou trusting, and security-trusting, there is a fourth dimension, *openness*. Openness-trust is an orientation or disposition towards the whole world, a readiness to receive what that world has to give, a readiness to hear what that world has to say, a readiness to probe that world for the truth about its realities, a readiness to rely on what is reliable and a readiness to recognize as unreliable what is so. It is a commitment to take the world and oneself as is, actually and possibly, for weal and woe, in frank acknowledgement and in welcome. It is a readiness to be affected: to be changed, to be confirmed, and, indeed, to be harmed; at this latter juncture it is vulnerability.

The contrast between openness and both reliance-trusting and I-Thou trusting is like the gestalt contrast between figure and ground: openness-trust is the ground against which specific trustings or mistrustings are situated. Both reliance-trusting and I-Thou trusting have a specific focus on things or persons; openness-trust does not focus on the particular. It is a disposition brought to every particular, but it is not brought to each as to a successive accumulation of individual and differentiated particulars; it is brought to whatever shows up, prior even to learning to tell things apart.

The opposite of openness is closedness. The more a person is closed, the more that person tends to be fixed in preconceptions, tends to cling to objects and persons. Closedness supports rigidity and fanaticism. It shows up in narrowness of vision, dullness of perception, limited awareness and sensitivity. At its extremes, it *must have* the world and the self in a certain way. It is willful or compulsive rather than responsive.

Openness-trust and closedness have epistemic consequences. Since the world has meaning to me according to my interests (but not only according to my interests), if my interests are self-consciously fixed in clinging, craving, or fear, then fresh meanings are less able to arise, aspects of the world and myself cannot connect with interests less conscious and sensitivities less customary. We can alter the Anselmian adage: *Fido ut intelligam*, I trust in order to understand. This openness-trust is the human spirit's extended hand of greeting and exploration. It is its window on the world. I extend myself to reality and expect that reality will get through to me; I query reality without excessive fear of getting slapped, and I have some

expectation that my questions, though they may get refined or turned, will meet with some response, either by answer or by seeing that the question is not a real question. Openness-trust is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for recognizing the genuine trustworthiness of others. The closed person not only basically mistrusts; he mis-takes. Closedness weakens human epistemic powers. The way in which a person can be open or closed is what psychologist Rollo May calls intentionality, the ability to have intentions. Openness-trust is healthy intentionality. “Willing is listening,” when “the tension has left intention.”<sup>40</sup>

Openness trust is the cognitive analogue to deep breathing. Interestingly, a Sanskrit word for trust or confidence, *viśvāsa*, is derived from roots which mean to breathe deeply, breathe freely; this word was chosen to translate into Sanskrit what Christian missionaries meant by faith, *pistis*. Another Sanskrit term, *śraddhā*, means openness and attention, a giving of one’s heart in openness and attention; *śraddhā* is also translated sometimes as trust.<sup>41</sup>

So there you have the four dimensions of trust. I have set them forth as pure forms, like the way in which Boyle's Law of the Ideal Gas sets forth relationships among pressure, volume, and temperature. Or, to return to my earlier conceptual metaphor, these dimensions are "slices" through the "body" of living, showing up some outlines that a slice at a different angle does not report. One could argue that there are more than four dimensions of trust, particularly by citing trust of a theory or trust of an institution. But I think that these four serve fairly well to analyze even theories and institutions.

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40. Drawing On Rollo May's treatment of intentionality in *Love and Will*, Marvin C. Shaw explores such intentionality in *The Paradox of Intention: Reaching the Goal by Giving up the Attempt to Reach It*, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion, no. 48 (Atlanta, Ga. and Ithaca, N.Y.: Scholars Press, 1989), 133.

41. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Faith and Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), on *viśvāsa*, 235n57; on *śraddhā* 59-68.

**FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.** What does all this suggest regarding religion, and therefore for philosophy of religion?

Religions generally have religious teachings, doctrines, narratives--propositions in texts. Propositions can be considered in the light of reliance trust, I-thou trust, and openness trust. Three voices point to trust-related functions of religious propositions. Thomas Aquinas observes: "The act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means."<sup>42</sup> Propositions are means, therefore. Robert Adams remarks: "[T]he central form of the sin of unbelief in Christian life . . . is not a refusal to assent intellectually to theological truths, but a failure to trust in truths to which we do assent."<sup>43</sup> Finally, Martin Buber in *I and Thou* speaks of I-thou relationships not only with persons and nature, but also with *geistige Wesenheiten*, what I call cultural artifacts, usually translated "spiritual beings."<sup>44</sup> These could be, for example, Biblical texts. While a text can in an I-It way be parsed, edited, and recited, occasion can arise when through it one can glimpse the absolute Thou. Reliance trust, I-thou trust, and openness trust are concepts useful for framing the question whether and how a religious text can be a means for contact with its topic, can be an occasion for glimpsing the absolute Thou, can be a window for learning of what is beyond that text.

The difference between I-Thou and I-It relations signals the need for not just analogy of being but also and especially analogy of attitude and analogy of relation. As Buber observes, one does not change from idolatry to true worship by keeping the same attitude and just switching the object.<sup>45</sup>

If trusting is understood to include not only active *entrusting* but also receptive or accepting depending, then we can examine religion's account of not initiating one's depending but discovering it. If

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42. *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 2, reply obj. 2.

43. Robert Merrihew Adams, *The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 17.

44. Kaufmann translation, 56-57, 115-117.

45. *I and Thou* (Kaufmann), 153-155.

trusting includes vulnerability, differently subjective and objective, then we can explore becoming aware of the religious difference between feeling vulnerable and being vulnerable. To entertain whether to trust God is to entertain both absolutely no risk and supreme risk, is to be absolutely invulnerable and absolutely vulnerable.<sup>46</sup> In Christian biblical theology God is absolutely devoted to God's people and cares for every hair on their heads; and yet a person who refuses to trust God undertakes supreme risk, the loss of all that is good, according to the conventional theology which understands that humans are subject to the most serious consequences for turning away from God.

While some may consider trust of God to be degenerate, totally different, or so untypical as not to be on the table for standard analyses of trust, one can ask whether some personages might stand as an ideal in trusting, as a paradigm in the exemplary sense. Kierkegaard's Abraham, Job, Jesus, and Mother Teresa show a trusting which borders on the best of human trusting--but on which side of that border? The Chinese Confucian philosophic usage of paradigmatic individuals who are ethically exemplary can serve as a model for reflection on the trusting of people taken to be religiously exemplary.<sup>47</sup>

I noted that embodiment may obtain, that is, particular relationships may make definite for me a more general basic trust. While this meshes with the citation with which I began, that some people have more trust for their government representative than they do for government, it may also mesh with the phenomenon of trusting a particular religious leader more and trusting the related religious institution less. The network of trust involved in institutions includes particular people trusted insofar as they embody, and not just instantiate, an institution. Such embodying may help figure out relationships between security trust as the basic background for specific reliance trust or distrust.

I note but do not now explain that with these four dimensions of trust there seem to be some arguments for the existence of God, arguments of an ontofiducial or cosmofiducial sort. Hans Küng, Donald Evans, and Richard Taylor come to mind, and perhaps Alvin Plantinga as well.

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46. Solomon and Flores remark on the "seeming" betrayals of one's trust in God.

47. After the manner of William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

Security trust also presents some fruitful exploratory insights. Christian theologians Hans Küng and Edward Schillebeeckx present an understanding of primal or fundamental trust distinguished from the particular trustings of this or that person or thing. The Zen and the Pure Land traditions of Japanese Buddhism offer, respectively, *jiriki* or Self-Trust and *tariki* or Other-Trust. *Tariki* has some similarities with security trust and openness trust.

To sum up: If we work with four dimensions of trust, we are conceiving of trust in ways helpful for philosophy of religion. Reliance trust is more familiar, but it cannot do all the work. I-thou trust, security trust, and openness trust help us take account of trusting which does not comfortably fit the model of reliance trust. They enable us to test using I-Thou language of Buber and others to see whether there is a kind of religious trust that fits. They enable us to distinguish fundamental trust from trustings specific to items and outcomes and persons, a kind of "cosmic" or "pervasive" or "climate" trust which may find a match in some religious doctrines about God's relation to the world. They enable us to speak of the unfocused openness that not only pays attention but serves as the human stance for receiving revelation, non-religious and religious. These four give us tools for understanding religious doctrines and practices, theories and institutions. And the notion of embodiment, touched on only lightly in these remarks, gives us a conceptual tool for understanding how some target of trust--one personally-known representative, for example--may participate in some larger backdrop of the presumptively trustworthy, or suspect, institution.

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